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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 20

The final contention of the defendant was that the city law imposed penalties for non-willful as well as willful violations, whereas
the state law only penalized willful violations, and that therefore the
local law was unconstitutional. But the defendant was convicted of
a willful violation. Thus the question of a non-willful violation is not
involved in this case, and the court will not anticipate a question of
constitutionality unless it is necessary to the proper rendition of judgment in the case. 5
E.W.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE-FALURE TO MAINFIRE DEPARTMENT AND EQUIPMENT.-A fire broke out in

TAIN

plaintiff's building, which destroyed his property. An action was
brought by him for damages suffered as a result of this fire. Plaintiff alleged that the city negligently failed to keep in repair the pressure and flow regulating valve located near plaintiff's property and
that by reason of such negligence an insufficient supply of water was
provided to combat effectively the fire in question. Plaintiff based
his right of action on the city charter which provided that the city
"may construct and operate a system of waterworks ... and it shall
maintain fire, police, school, and poor departments." Held, for defendant. The complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. (2d)
704 (1945).
The majority opinion in this case reasoned that although the
defendant's sovereign immunity was waived by Section 8 of the Court
of Claims Act, its liability, like that of an individual or a corporation,
was predicated on the circumstances alleged in the complant. Accordingly, there would be no cause of action against an individual
because of failure to protect property from destruction by fire which
was started by another unless a duty to quench the fire or indemnify
the loss had been assumed by agreement or imposed by statute. There
was no such agreement in this instance, the liability rested solely on
the city charter defining its power of government, which has been
interpreted as not to protect the personal interest of the individual but
for the benefit of the community as a whole. "If the plaintiff is to
prevail, one who negligently omits to supply sufficient pressure to
extinguish a fire started by another assumes an obligation to pay the
ensuing damage, though the whole city is laid low. A promisor will
not be deemed to have had in mind the assumption of a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward." 1 An intention to allow the people
of the city to recover for fire damages to their property for any omis5 Burton v. United

States, 196 U. S. 283, 295, 25 Sup. Ct. 243 (1905).

1 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 166, 159 N. E. 896, 898
(1928).
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sion in keeping hydrants, valves, or pipes in repair, would have to be
stated in unequivocal language 2 The language of the legislature
found in the city charter connotes nothing more than a creation of
departments of municipal government, the grant of essential powers
of government and directions as t6 their exercise. The individual
interest is protected only in its submersion in the protection afforded
him as a member of the public.'
The dissenting opinion argued that the complaint did state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, insofar as it alleged that the
city after installing fire fighting equipment permitted it to fall into
disrepair and disuse. When a government neglects the performance
of a duty imposed upon it for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the plaintiff and persons similarly situated, it is liable for the
injuries caused by such neglect. 4 The freedom from liability of a
city for its failure to furnish adequate fire protection was heretofore
based upon governmental immunity from liability in performing a
governmental function,3 and since this immunity was removed by
statute, the city was liable for its negligent acts committed while engaged in a governmental function. This argument would be convincing except that in order to predicate liability, there must be a
duty owing to the individual plaintiff which was violated by the city.
Here the charter created a benefit for the inhabitants and only a general duty to the city as a society, but did not create a duty owing to
the plaintiff as an individual.
M. K. B.

2 Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46,
42 N.3 E. 405 (1895).
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